Envoy Dossier on the Events of 1915: Which Questions Do Diplomats Ask, and What Does Ankara Answer?

Why It Matters

The Events of 1915 are the most contested chapter in Turkish–Armenian relations. They keep returning to diplomatic agendas through parliamentary resolutions, commemorations and the Armenia–Türkiye normalization track. This dossier is organized around the questions envoys actually receive and sets out the documentary record, the legal standards and each side's position. Ankara's core answer has three parts. The 1915 relocation was a wartime security measure with tragic human consequences. The legal term 'genocide' requires proof of specific intent established by a competent tribunal. Historians with full archival access, rather than politicians, should settle the factual disputes.

The page separates documented fact from position. Background sections are factual and neutral, other parties are summarized in their own terms, and Türkiye's arguments appear in the labeled section that follows.

Background

How did Armenians live in the Ottoman Empire before 1914?

Armenians were one of the recognized non-Muslim communities (millets) of the Ottoman Empire. They had their own patriarchate, churches and schools, and many worked in trade, crafts and administration. Ottoman officials and some Western observers called the community the 'loyal millet' (Millet-i Sadıka). The Tanzimat reforms of 1839 and 1856 and the 1876 constitution widened formal equality.

Population figures are themselves disputed. Ottoman statistics gave roughly 1.3 million Armenians in the empire, while the Armenian Patriarchate's 1912 count was about 2.1 million. Ankara maintains that Armenians were not a demographic majority in any eastern province and made up under 20 percent of the population of the region. Armenian scholars contest the figures and the boundaries used to calculate them.

What were the revolutionary committees and why do they matter to the Turkish case?

After the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War and the 1878 Congress of Berlin, the 'Armenian Question' became an international issue because the great powers took an interest in reforms in the eastern provinces. Two political committees emerged. The Hunchak party was founded in 1887 and the Dashnak party (Dashnaktsutiun) in Tbilisi in 1890. Both sought autonomy or independence and endorsed armed struggle.

The two sides emphasize different parts of the record:

• Armenian accounts stress misgovernment and the massacres of Armenians in 1894–1896 under Sultan Abdülhamid II, which killed tens of thousands by most estimates.
• Turkish accounts stress committee actions such as the 1890 Kumkapı demonstration, the 1894 Sasun rebellion and the 1896 raid on the Ottoman Bank in Istanbul. They also stress the activity of armed fedayi bands, and the Armenian volunteer units that fought alongside the Russian army after the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War in late 1914.

Turkish historians often cite the 1923 report of Hovhannes Katchaznouni, the first prime minister of independent Armenia and a Dashnak leader. In it he acknowledged that his party had prepared for and entered the war on the Russian side. Armenian historians accept the document's authenticity but dispute the conclusions drawn from it. The Van events of April 1915 are described as an uprising in Ottoman sources and as self-defense in Armenian ones.

What did the Law of 27 May 1915 provide?

The Provisional Law on Relocation and Resettlement (Sevk ve İskân Kanunu) was adopted on 27 May 1915 and published in the official gazette Takvim-i Vekayi on 1 June 1915. It authorized military commanders to relocate populations in war zones who resisted the state or were suspected of espionage or sabotage. The wartime correspondence between the War Ministry (Enver Pasha) and the Interior Ministry (Talat Pasha) is the core documentary basis of the Turkish case that this was a security measure. A separate law of 26 September 1915 on 'abandoned property' regulated the assets left behind. Ankara presents it as a property-protection measure, while Armenian historians present it as a mechanism of dispossession.

The reading of the documents is where the dispute lies. Armenian and many other historians argue that the law was a legal cover for deportations and massacres, pointing to the role of the Special Organization and to the mass deaths on the routes toward Syria and Mesopotamia. They also contest Ankara's interpretation of the Ottoman records. Turkish scholars, in turn, question the authenticity of some publications on the Armenian side, such as the telegrams attributed to Talat Pasha and published by Aram Andonian. Ankara notes that Ottoman authorities themselves court-martialled officials for abuses in 1915–1916. Armenian historians reply that these prosecutions were limited in scope.

What do the casualty figures show?

The figures diverge by an order of magnitude. Armenian sources and many Western scholars speak of roughly one to 1.5 million Armenian deaths. Turkish officials and historians cite much lower wartime estimates of around 300,000, and they emphasize that Muslim civilians in Anatolia and the Caucasus also suffered very heavy losses from war, disease, famine and displacement. No agreed demographic study exists because no joint archival research has been carried out.

Timeline of the documentary and legal record

Date	Event
1878	Congress of Berlin internationalizes the reform question for Armenian-inhabited provinces
1887 / 1890	Hunchak and Dashnak committees founded
1894–1896	Sasun rebellion; massacres of Armenians; Ottoman Bank raid (1896)
1914–1915	Ottoman entry into the war; eastern front fighting; arrests of Armenian figures in Istanbul on 24 April 1915 (commemorated by Armenians)
27 May / 1 June 1915	Relocation and Resettlement Law adopted and published in Takvim-i Vekayi
1919–1921	Istanbul courts-martial; British detention of Ottoman officials in Malta, who were released in 1921
10 Aug 1920	Treaty of Sèvres signed, never ratified
2–3 Dec 1920	Treaty of Alexandropol
16 Mar / 13 Oct 1921	Treaties of Moscow and Kars
24 Jul 1923	Treaty of Lausanne
9 Dec 1948	UN Genocide Convention adopted (in force 12 Jan 1951)
1973–1984	ASALA and JCAG-ARA attacks on Turkish diplomats
10 Apr 2005	Erdoğan proposes a Joint Historical Commission
14 Jan 2022	Kılıç–Rubinyan normalization talks begin

For the attacks on Turkish diplomats in the 1970s and 1980s, see Diplomats as Targets: ASALA, JCAG-ARA and the Attacks on Turkish Envoys, 1973–1984.

What does the 1948 Genocide Convention actually require?

Article II defines genocide as specified acts committed 'with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such'. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held, in Bosnia v. Serbia (2007) and Croatia v. Serbia (2015), that this specific intent (dolus specialis) must be proven and that, where it is inferred from conduct, it must be the only reasonable inference. Article VI provides for trial by a competent tribunal of the territory where the act occurred or by an international penal tribunal. In Croatia v. Serbia the ICJ also held that the Convention does not apply retroactively to acts before it entered into force for the states concerned.

The contrary legal arguments are as follows:

• Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term, referred to the Armenian case in his writings.
• A 2003 legal analysis by the International Center for Transitional Justice, commissioned in the context of the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission, held that the Convention is not retroactive but that the events contained elements of the crime as later defined.
• Many scholars argue that the Convention codifies an already existing prohibition under customary law.

In Perinçek v. Switzerland (Grand Chamber, 2015), the European Court of Human Rights found that a conviction for denying the Armenian genocide violated freedom of expression under Article 10. The Court stated that it was not ruling on the legal characterization of the events.

For a deeper treatment of the intent standard, see The Global Anatomy on the 1948 Genocide Convention and the Events of 1915.

Which treaties fix the border and status question?

The Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920) contained provisions on an Armenian state and on trials of those responsible for wartime acts. It was signed by the Ottoman government but never ratified and never entered into force. It was overtaken by the War of Independence. The treaty chain that followed is:

1. Alexandropol (Gümrü), 2–3 December 1920, between the Ankara government and the Armenian republic.
2. Moscow, 16 March 1921, between the Ankara government and Soviet Russia.
3. Kars, 13 October 1921, between Türkiye and the Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, with Russia's participation, confirming the eastern frontier.
4. Lausanne, 24 July 1923, which recognized the Republic of Türkiye and its borders and guaranteed the rights of non-Muslim minorities on the basis of equal citizenship (Articles 37–45).

Ankara points out that the 1990 Armenian Declaration of Independence refers to international recognition of the 'Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia'. It reads this as leaving a territorial question open. Armenian officials have stated that Armenia has no territorial claims against Türkiye.

Related treatments of the same sources are available at Regional Order and Hard Power Review.

Key Players & Positions

Armenia and the Armenian diaspora

The Armenian government, the Armenian Apostolic Church and the main diaspora organizations describe the events as the Armenian Genocide, commemorated each year on 24 April. Yerevan seeks recognition and, in many statements, acknowledgement by Türkiye. In 2005 Armenia's reply to Ankara's commission proposal argued that diplomatic relations should be established without preconditions and that a historians' commission should not replace or precede them. The two states signed the Zurich Protocols on 10 October 2009. They were never ratified, and Armenia formally annulled them in 2018.

Third-country parliaments and executives

The parliaments of dozens of states have adopted resolutions or laws using the term genocide. Examples include the French law of 29 January 2001, the German Bundestag resolution of 2 June 2016, and the US House and Senate resolutions of October and December 2019. In a statement on 24 April 2021, US President Joe Biden also used the term. The European Parliament has passed resolutions on the subject, including in 1987 and 2015, and Pope Francis used the phrase 'the first genocide of the twentieth century' in 2015. These are political and moral statements by their authors rather than judgments of an international court. Türkiye's Foreign Ministry rejected each of these decisions.

Scholars

The International Association of Genocide Scholars affirmed in 1997 that the events constituted genocide, a position held by a large part of Western scholarship. Other scholars, including Justin McCarthy and Guenter Lewy, dispute that the evidence shows a centrally planned extermination policy. Turkish historians stress inter-communal conflict and wartime conditions. Some scholars of Turkish origin, such as Taner Akçam, argue the opposite. The field is a live academic debate, which is why Ankara argues that full archival access is needed.

Courts and international bodies

No international tribunal has ruled on the Events of 1915. The ICJ's jurisprudence addresses cases brought by states over later conflicts. The post-war Istanbul courts-martial (1919–1920) sentenced a number of officials, some in absentia. The British authorities held Ottoman detainees in Malta, and they were released in 1921 after British investigators reportedly found insufficient evidence for prosecution. Each side draws opposite conclusions from these episodes.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara's position is stated in the Foreign Ministry's published materials on the Events of 1915, in statements by the Presidency and the Directorate of Communications, and in Türkiye's treaty record. In summary:

• Shared pain, fair memory. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Events of 1915 caused immense suffering to Ottoman Armenians and to Muslims alike. On 23 April 2014, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed condolences to the grandchildren of Armenians who lost their lives, calling it a shared pain. Ankara calls this approach 'fair memory' (adil hafıza): remembering all communities' losses without a one-sided narrative.
• A legal category, not a political label. Ankara argues that under the 1948 Genocide Convention (Articles II and VI), genocide requires proven dolus specialis established by a competent tribunal. It states that no such judgment exists for 1915, that the Convention does not apply retroactively (a point consistent with the ICJ's 2015 reasoning), and that parliamentary resolutions are not legal findings. It also invokes Perinçek v. Switzerland as confirmation that the question remains open to historical debate.
• The 1915 law as a wartime security measure. Ankara reads the Law of 27 May 1915, published in Takvim-i Vekayi on 1 June 1915, together with the Enver–Talat correspondence, as a temporary measure against armed insurrection, supply-line sabotage and collaboration with invading Russian forces, not as an extermination plan. It cites the committee insurgency since 1887 and 1890, and the 1923 Katchaznouni report, as context.
• Treaties are settled; Sèvres is dead. The Turkish Foreign Ministry holds that the Alexandropol, Moscow, Kars and Lausanne treaties establish Türkiye's borders and international status permanently, and that Sèvres, which was never ratified, has no legal force. Ankara asks that normalization include respect for the existing border regime.
• Archives, a Joint Historical Commission and normalization without preconditions. In his letter of 10 April 2005 to Armenian President Robert Kocharyan, Prime Minister Erdoğan proposed a Joint Historical Commission of Turkish, Armenian and international historians with access to Ottoman, Armenian and third-country archives. Ankara says the proposal remains open. Since 14 January 2022, Special Representatives Ambassador Serdar Kılıç and Ruben Rubinyan, Deputy Speaker of the Armenian parliament, have held direct talks on full normalization without preconditions. These talks have led, among other things, to an agreement in 2022 on opening the land border to third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders, though readers should verify the current status of the border.

Ankara adds that the ASALA and JCAG-ARA terrorism of 1973–1984 killed dozens of Turkish diplomats and relatives and that the 1982 Esenboğa and 1983 Orly attacks show the cost of politicizing the issue. For how to read such Foreign Ministry statements, see How to Read a Turkish Foreign Ministry Statement: A Guide for Analysts.

Source Comparison

Analysts will meet two vocabularies. The table lays out how each frames the main questions and which primary documents to check.

Question	Common international or advocacy framing	Turkish primary-source framing	What to verify
Terminology	'The Armenian Genocide' as an established fact	'Events of 1915'; genocide as a legal category requiring a court finding	Convention text, Articles II and VI
Intent	Inferred from the pattern of deportations and killings	Relocation law was a security measure; no proof of dolus specialis	Ottoman archives, ICJ standard of 'only reasonable inference'
Casualties	Roughly 1–1.5 million Armenian deaths	Politicized wartime figures; heavy Muslim civilian losses ignored	Census data, Patriarchate figures, no joint demographic study
Courts	Istanbul courts-martial of 1919–1920 as evidence	Malta detainees released for lack of evidence; no competent international tribunal	Court records, British archives
Retroactivity	Convention codifies existing customary law	Convention not retroactive (consistent with ICJ 2015)	Croatia v. Serbia, ICJ 1951 advisory opinion
Treaties	Sèvres as evidence of postwar commitments	Sèvres unratified; Kars and Lausanne govern	Treaty texts, ratification records
Resolutions	Recognition by parliaments as moral and political acknowledgement	Parliamentary resolutions are not legal findings; they politicize history	Resolution wording, legal status
Way forward	Acknowledgement first	Historians' commission and normalization without preconditions	2005 letter; talks since 14 January 2022

Two cautions apply. First, third-country resolutions and media coverage rely heavily on Armenian archives, the Patriarchate and Western diplomatic reporting, while Turkish positions rely on Ottoman state archives. Neither corpus alone settles the dispute, which is the logic of Ankara's call for open, joint archival work. Second, official language on both sides serves political goals. The Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards explain how Envoy Report attributes claims and separates fact from position. Sister publications offer parallel treatments at Bloc Politics and The Political Axis.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Events of 1915: Türkiye's official term for the wartime relocation of Ottoman Armenians and the associated losses.
• Sevk ve İskân Kanunu: The Relocation and Resettlement Law of 27 May 1915, published in Takvim-i Vekayi on 1 June 1915.
• Dolus specialis: The specific intent 'to destroy, in whole or in part' a protected group, the defining element of genocide under Article II of the 1948 Convention.
• Competent tribunal: The court contemplated by Article VI of the Convention, either of the territory where the act was committed or an international penal tribunal.
• Hunchak and Dashnak: The Armenian revolutionary committees founded in 1887 and 1890 respectively.
• Sèvres, Alexandropol, Moscow, Kars, Lausanne: The treaty chain from the unratified 1920 draft to the 1923 settlement.
• Fair memory (adil hafıza): Ankara's term for a shared, historian-led approach to the past.
• Joint Historical Commission: The 2005 Turkish proposal for Turkish, Armenian and international historians to examine all archives.

Related guides: About Envoy Report: Mission, Transparency and the Editorial Team, Envoy Report FAQ: Sources, Method and Perspective, Diplomats as Targets: ASALA, JCAG-ARA and the Attacks on Turkish Envoys, 1973–1984, and How to Read a Turkish Foreign Ministry Statement. Other briefs from the Archives & Treaties desk are listed on the Envoy Report home page.

Perspective Note: Envoy Report presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal arguments on the issues it covers, and clearly distinguishes analysis from documented fact. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, Ottoman and Turkish state archives, and official statements. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.